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INFORMED CONSENT IN OKLAHOMA: A SEARCH
FOR REASONABLENESS AND PREDICTABILITY IN
THE AFTERMATH OF SC07T V. BRADFORD
ERIC S. FISHER*

Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to
determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who
performs an operation on a patient without his patient's consent

commits assault ....

c Judge Benjamin Cardozo
Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital'

L Introduction
Since 1914 American jurisprudence has followed Justice Cardozo's lead,
developing the legal axiom that informed consent in the medical context consists of
"[a] person's agreement to allow something to happen (such as surgery) that is based
on a full disclosure of facts needed to make the decision intelligently."2 Nevertheless, physicians, lawyers, courts, and scholars have struggled for nearly eighty
years trying to elucidate the standard for determining when a patient's consent is
truly "informed."' Indeed, numerous interpretations of the' informed consent

standard have developed,4 and it is not surprising that in the last thirty years

* Associate, Crowe & Dunlevy, Oklahoma City, Okla. B.S., 1988, University of Kansas; M.S.,
1989, Northwestern University; J.D. with honors, 1996, University of Oklahoma College of Law. The
author wishes to thank R. Darryl Fisher, M.D., J.D., for his inspiration for and endless review of this
article.
1. 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).
2. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 779 (6th ed. 1990).
3. Although courts have recognized the requirement of obtaining a patient's consent since close to
the turn of the century, see, e.g., Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914),
it was not until the late 1950s that courts began to require that the consent be "informed," see, e.g., Salgo
v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 317 P.2d 170, 180 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957) (holding that
disclosure and consent must be informed to be effective). See generally Alan Meisel, The Expansion of
Liabilityfor Medical Accidents: From Negligence to Strict Liability by Way of Informed Consent, 56
NED. L. REv. 51 (1977) (discussing the historical development of informed consent in the medical
context).
4. See generally William J. Curran, J.D., M.D., S.M. Hyg., Informed Consent in Medical
Malpractice Cases: A Turn Towards Reality, 314 NEw ENG. J. MED. 429 (1985) (discussing the
unrealistic burden of some forms of informed consent); Elizabeth G. Patterson, The Therapeutic
Justificationfor Withholding Medical Information: What You Don't Know Can'tHurt You, or Can It?,
64 NEB. L. REv. 721 (1985) (discussing the "professional" and "materiality" standards for medical
informed consent and their different subvariations).
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informed consent has generated more scholarly articles, books, guidelines, debate,
and confusion than any other medicolegal issue.5 Furthermore, informed consent
has created much antagonism between physicians6 and patients' lawyers because the
informed consent issue is frequently incorporated into medical negligence lawsuits.7
Sixty-five years after Judge Cardozo authored the New York Court of Appeals'
opinion in Schloendorff, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in Scott v. Bradford'
created a standard for informed consent that has proved illogical in its reasoning and
unworkable in its application. The Scott court held that a physician must inform a
patient of a treatnment's risks to the extent that each individual, not necessarily a
reasonable individual, would have needed to know before consenting.9 This extreme
standard places an unreasonable burden on the doctor who, in order to avoid
liability, must inform the patient of every possible risk of the proposed procedure."
In a recent edition of the Oklahoma Law Review, Professor William J. McNichols
presented an article entitled "Informed Consent Liability in a 'Material Information'
Jurisdiction: What Does the Future Portend?"" Professor McNichols provided a
detailed historical review of the informed consent doctrine, examined the "Material
Information" standard set forth in the Scott decision, compared the Oklahoma
standard to other national trends in informed consent, and discussed the complexities
of informed consent litigation, especially lawsuits arising in "jurisdictions with a

5. See Dorothy R. Gregory, M.D., J.D., MedicolegalRounds - Informed Consent, RESIDENT &
PHYSICIAN, Sept. 1985, at 95 (discussing the volume of debate and publication surrounding
informed consent).
6. The author use; the term "physician" for simplicity, but most health care providers that perform
medical treatments or sargical treatments are subject to providing their patients informed consent.
7. See Gary L. Bc land, The Doctrineof Lack of Consentand Lack of Informed Consent in Medical
Proceduresin Louisiana,45 LA. L. REV. 1 (1985). This article discusses the role informed consent plays
in most typical medical negligence cases and how plaintiffs lawyers are increasingly including informed
consent claims as a matter of course when filing a medical negligence action. The author opines that:
[a] patient who has suffered an undesired result of treatment and is unable to prove that
his doctor was negligent can also seek relief on a different basis of liability - lack of
informed consert. An allegation of a lack of informed consent will not only fortify a
weak case of m.dical negligence, it will also guarantee the plaintiff that his case will
reach the jury. As a result, it is hardly surprising that the percentage of malpractice suits
alleging a lack cf informed consent is increasing.
Id. at 1-2 (footnotes omitted).
8. 606 P.2d 554 (Okla. 1979).
9. See id. at 558. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma adopted the subjective standard by holding
that:
[Tihe scope of a physician's communications must be measured by his patient's need to
know enough to enable him to make an intelligent choice. In other words, full disclosure
of all material ri ks incident to treatment must be made. There is no bright line separating
the material from the immaterial; it is a question of fact. A risk is material if it would be
likely to affect the patient's decision. When non-disclosure of a particular risk is open to
debate, the issue is for the finder of facts.
Id.
10. See id.
11. William J. McNichols, Informed Consent Liability in a "MaterialInformation" Jurisdiction:
What Does the Future Portend?,48 OKLA. L. REv. 711 (1995).
STAFF
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liberal 'material information' disclosure standard."'" While Professor McNichols'
article provides perhaps the most current and in depth resource for practitioners
faced with informed consent issues, the article concludes by stressing the need for
a "workable balance" between the "two competing values: (1) the ethical value of
patient autonomy and (2) the medical ethic of beneficence," which are the natural
byproducts of informed consent law. 3 This article seeks to strike some balance
between these concerns by suggesting a legislative response modeled after the
statutory framework established by the Texas legislature.
The jurisprudential development of informed consent in Texas followed a more
reasoned and moderate path than in Oklahoma when the Texas legislature in 1977
enacted the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act 4 establishing, inter
alia, a Disclosure Panel responsible for placing all medical treatments and surgical
procedures on two disclosure lists." The first list (List A) includes those
procedures for which full disclosure is required, whereas the second list (List B)
includes those procedures requiring no disclosure. 6 More importantly, the
Disclosure Panel "establish[es] the degree of disclosure required and the form in
which the disclosure will be made."' 7
The Texas standard of informed consent eliminates the "guesswork among
physicians while providing uniformity and predictability to the otherwise unpredictable nature of disclosure."'" The Oklahoma standard as defined by the Supreme
Court of Oklahoma in Scott, on the other hand, relies on the patient's "hindsight and
20/20 vision" which might be clouded by self-interest. 9 Responding to this
concern about the lenient Oklahoma standard, Justice Doolin of the Supreme Court
of Oklahoma gave a less than comforting response in Scott, stating that "[a]lthough
it may be said this approach places a physician at the mercy of a patient's hindsight,
a careful practitioner can always protect himself by insuring that he has adequately
informed each patient he treats. If he does not breach this duty, a causation problem
will not arise."' Notwithstanding Justice Doolin's duty of care prescription, even
the most careful physician faces an unreasonable burden of informing patients in
Oklahoma.

12. Id. at 712.
13. Id. at 753.
14. Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act, ch. 817, pt. 1, 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws 2039
(codified as amended at Tx. Ray. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i (West Supp. 1997)). See infra Part III
for a detailed discussion of the Act; see also Max Sherman & Michael L. Pate, The Texas Legislature
and Medical Malpractice, 10 TFx. TECH L. REV. 339, 340-49 (1979) (discussing the legislative history
of the Act).

15. See TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, §§ 6.03(c), 6.04(a) (West Supp. 1997).
16. See id. § 6.04(a), (b).
17. Id. § 6.04(b).
18. D. Michael Wallach & Steven J. Berry, Informed Consent in Texas: A Proposal for
Reasonablenessand Predictability,18 ST. MARY's U. 835, 856 (1987).
19. See id.; see, e.g., Reikes v. Martin, 471 So. 2d 385, 391 (Miss. 1985) (physician defendant
placed at the mercy of a disgruntled patient's "bitterness and disillusionment").
20. Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 559 (Okla. 1979).
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This article proposes a practical approach to revising Oklahoma's medical
informed consent standard, using the Texas Medical Liability and Insurance
Improvement Act Es a template upon which the Oklahoma legislature can pattern
legislation to establish an Oklahoma standard that is equipoised between the health
care provider's duties and the patient's rights. This article suggests an approach to
informed consent in Oklahoma that is achievable without compromising patients'
rights or unfairly burdening physicians.
Part II of this article provides a historical perspective on the doctrine of informed
consent in the medical context. Part III presents an overview of the development
and current status of the Texas standard for informed consent. Part IV traces
Oklahoma's treatment and mistreatment of informed consent from its inception to
its current standard. Part V suggests a framework for informed consent legislation
in Oklahoma based on modifying the Texas Medical Liability and Insurance
Improvement Act. Finally, Part VI offers some observations regarding the future of
informed consent.
11. HistoricalDevelopment of Informed Consent
A. The Battery Theory

The concept of informed consent originated in several cases at the beginning of
this century with patients suing their physicians on a battery theory, claiming they
never consented to the physical touching involved with a procedure.21 For example,
in 1906 the Supreme Court of Illinois in the case of Pratt v. Davis" heard Ms.
Davis claiming that she "had placed herself under the care of appellant, and that he
(Dr. Pratt), without her consent or the consent of anyone authorized to act for
her.., removed her uterus."' In affirming the judgment in favor of Ms. Davis,
the court held that:
Ordinarily, where the patient is in full possession of all his mental
faculties and in such physical health as to be able to consult about his
condition without the consultation itself being fraught with dangerous
consequences to the patient's health, and when no emergency exists
making it impracticable to confer with him, it is manifest that his
consent should be a prerequisite to a surgical operation. [Otherwise, we
must hold the] act to have been a trespass to the person.2
Eight years after Pratt, then-Judge Benjamin Cardozoe wrote the majority

21. See, e.g., Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12, 16 (Minn. 1905) (holding that plaintiff was entitled
to receive damages for procedure performed on her without her consent); Rolater v. Strain, 137 P. 96,
99 (Okla. 1913) (holding that physician's removal of a bone when patient expressly instructed against
the procedure was a valid cause of action under the theory of battery).
22. 79 N.E. 562 (IIl. 1906).
23. Id. at 563.
24. Id. at 564.
25. Benjamin Nathan Cardozo served on the New York Court of Appeals from 1914 to 1932. He
was confirmed as a United States Supreme Court Justice in 1932, but served as and was referred to as
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opinion in the seminal case of Schloendorff v. Society of New York HospitalI
firmly establishing the standard which a majority of jurisdictions would follow in
medical informed consent negligence cases for the next half centuryY' Judge
Cardozo articulated the standard that every person is vested with a right to control
what shall be done to his own body. Therefore, unless extenuating circumstances
exist, such as an emergency, or the patient is otherwise unable to provide consent
to a procedure, the physician must refrain from treatment until the patient consents.
Cardozo explained this premise:
In the case at hand, the wrong complained of is not merely negligence.
It is trespass. Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a
right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon
who performs an operation without his patient's consent commits an
assault, for which he is liable in damages. This is true, except in cases
of emergency where the patient is unconscious, and where it is
necessary to operate before consent can be obtained. The fact that the
wrong complained of here is trespass, rather than negligence, distinguishes this case from most of the cases that have preceded it....
Relatively to this transaction, the plaintiff was a stranger. She had never
consented to become a patient for any purpose other than an
examination under ether. She had never waived the right to recover
damages for any wrong resulting from this operation, for she had
forbidden the operation.
B. Development of "Informed" Consent
For nearly half a century, Schloendorff and its battery theory held true as the
standard for failure to obtain a patient's consent before a procedure. However, in
1957, the California Court of Appeals recast the informed consent standard. In
Salgo v. Leland Stanford, Jr. University Board of Trustees, the California court
addressed the issue of whether a physician must inform a patient of risks inherent
to a procedure before the patient could truly consent to the treatment.
The plaintiff in Salgo entered a hospital complaining of leg cramps, and the
defendant physicians recommended a translumbar aortography x-ray to localize the

"Judge" while on the New York Court of Appeals. It has been said that there is no "Justice" in the New
York Court of Appeals because the Judges are not referred to as Justices. However, while on the court
of appeals, Judge Cardozo penned many judicially sound and precisely written opinions, such as
MacPherson v. Buick, 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916) (a landmark products liability case) and Jacobs &
Young v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921) (a landmark contract case). See generally KERMrr L. HILL,
THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

127-28 (1992).

26. 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).
27. See Boland, supra note 7, at 4.
28. See Schloendorff, 105 N.E. at 93-94.
29. Id (citations omitted). This quotation is one of the most cited passages in articles pertaining to
informed consent. See Boland, supra note 7, at 4.
30. 317 P.2d 170 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957).
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circulatory problem.' Complications developed during the procedure, and the
patient was permanently paralyzed. The Salgo court held that the physician must
not only obtain the patient's consent to the procedure, but the consent must be given
after adequately informing the patient. Justice Bray, writing for the Salgo
majority, held that a physician must disclose in good faith all facts relevant to the
patient's decision, stating that
a physician violates his duty to his patient and subjects himself to
liabilityifhe withholds any facts which are necessary to form the basis
of an intelligent consent by the patient to the proposed treatment.
Likewise, the physician may not minimize the known dangers of a
procedure or operation in order to induce his patient's consent.'
Over the next thirty-eight years, the California courts continued to mold the
jurisprudential development of informed consent, focusing on the materiality of
undisclosed information.
In Cobbs v. Grant," the defendant doctor diagnosed the plaintiffs peptic ulcer
and ultimately performed surgery to relieve the gastric condition. Although the
defendant physician discussed the general nature of the operation with the plaintiff,
the physician failed to disclose certain inherent risks involved in the procedure.37
Following the initial surgery, complications developed which necessitated three
additional surgeries and the removal of fifty percent of the plaintiffs stomach.3
In holding that "this case constitute[d] a classic illustration of an action that
'
the Supreme Court of California moved away from the
sounds in negligence,"39
battery theory of informed consent to an action based in negligence. 4 The Cobbs
court sought to distinguish between relief under the battery theory and the breach
of duty to inform the patient under a negligence theory, by stating:
[T]he battery theory should be reserved for those circumstances when
a doctor performs an operation to which the plaintiff has not consented.
When the patient gives permission to perform one type of treatment and
the doctor performs another, the requisite element of deliberate intent
to deviate from the consent given is present. However, when the patient
consents to certain treatment and the doctor performs that treatment,
but an undiscl9sed inherentcomplicationwith a low probability occurs,
no intentional deviation from the consent given appears; rather the
doctor in obtaining consent may have failed to meet his due care duty

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

See iULat 173.
See id. at 174-75.
See id.at 181.
Id.(emphasis added).
502 P.2d I (Cal, 1972).
See id. at 4.

37.
38.
39.
40.

See id
See id at 4-5.
d. at 8.
See id
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to disclose pertinent information. In that situation the action should be
pleaded in negligence.!4'
Furthermore, even if there is a minimal inherent risk to the procedure, the Cobbs
court held that the physician is nonetheless required to explain fully the risks to the
patient' This disclosure requirement presents an even more difficult question, i.e.,
by what standard should informing the patient of these inherent risks be measured?
C. Standards of Disclosure
Once courts recognize that a physician has a duty to inform the patient of the
inherent risks of a proposed medical procedure, the difficult question becomes what
is sufficient disclosure and from whose viewpoint is the sufficiency measured. Two
distinct theories exist: the professional standard and the materiality standard.
Furthermore, the materiality standard is bifurcated into a subjective patient method
and a reasonable patient method. The professional standard is based on what a
43
reasonable physician would disclose under similar circumstances. Conversely, the
materiality standard focuses on what information about the medical procedure a
patient would deem necessary to provide or refuse consent."
1. The ProfessionalStandard
The majority of jurisdictions use a professional standard as the basis for
determining the extent of required disclosures for informed consent.' There are
generally two critical factors to the professional standard: a disclosure that a
reasonable practitioner in a similar community would disclose" and the burden of
proof that the physician breached this standard.47 Recently, some courts have
abandoned the locality rule and adopted a national standard which focuses on what
reasonable practitioners in the country would disclose, rather than what a
practitioner in a similar community would disclose."
The main policy consideration undergirding the professional standard is that
physicians are best able to determine the risks and consequences that should be
disclosed to a patient. 49 Laymen are generally considered unable to determine what
facts are material and necessary for a patient to know before giving an informed

41. Id. (emphasis added).

42. See id. at 11.
43. See, e.g., Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668, 675 (Mo. 1965) (holding that the professional
standard applies in medical malpractice claims).
44. See, e.g., Sard v. Hardy, 379 A.2d 1014, 1022 (Md. 1977) (holding that the materiality standard
applies in medical malpractice claims).

45. See Patterson, supra note 4, at 724.
46. See Allan H. McCoid, The Care Required ofMedical Practitioners,12 VAND. L. REv. 549, 558,
569-75 (1959); see also Karp v. Colley, 493 F.2d 408, 420 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding that the community
standard is appropriate for the professional standard in informed consent cases).
47. See McCoid, supra note 46, at 568.
48. See, e.g., Guebard v. Jabaay, 452 N.E.2d 751 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (rejecting the locality rule).

49. See Patterson, supra note 4, at 729, for a detailed discussion of the theory that physicians know
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Also, allowing a layman to testify about the proper standard of

disclosure would fcrce a physician to make decisions based on what a layman, and

ultimately a jury, might deem reasonable, rather than on what is in the best interest
of the patient.",
2. The Materiality Standard

A majority of jurisdictions contend that the professional standard vests too much
discretion in the medical profession,52 allowing the physician to determine what
disclosure is neces, ary and circumvent patients' rights to choose what procedures
can be performed on their bodies. 3 On the other hand, the materiality standard
focuses on what a patient would want to know about a procedure before consenting,
rather than what a physician believes should be disclosed. Two divergent schools
of thought regarding the materiality standard have evolved: first, the reasonable
patient method and, second, the individual patient method.
a) The Reasonable PatientMethod
The landmark case of Canterbury v. Spence'M abandoned the professional
standard for informed consent and adopted the materiality standard!' The
Canterbury court held that it was "the prerogative of the patient, not the physician,
56

to determine for himself the direction in which his interests seem to lie.

Nevertheless, the court's holding gave direction to courts in determining whether a

"reasonable patient" in a similar circumstance would have declined treatment had
he known the full extent of the risks associated with the proposed procedure.

Accordingly, severad commentators have criticized the Canterbury decision for
adopting this objective or reasonable patient method because it essentially
"backtracks" on the individual patient's right of self-determination.' Nonetheless,

50. See id.
51. See McCoid, supra note 46, at 560-71 (discussing the compromising affect allowing laymen to
testify might have a phy,:ician's ability to make decisions with the patient's best interest in mind, rather
than what will play best before the jury). This issue has given rise to the therapeutic exception whereby
physicians may withhold information from a patient if the physician believes the patient would suffer
from the knowledge of sach risks and consequences. See infra notes 59-60 and accompanying text for
a detailed discussion of the "therapeutic privilege."
52. See, e.g., Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554 (Okla. 1979) (holding that a patient should be able
to decide what is materirI to his/her decision to consent to a procedure); see also Patterson, supra note
4, at 726 (discussing te drawbacks of the professional standard). See infra notes 137-61 and
accompanying text for a detailed discussion of the Scott case.
53. See Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) ("Every human being
of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a
surgeon who performs an operation on a patient without his patient's consent commits an assault ... .
54. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
55. See id. at 780.
56. Id. at 781.
57. See Jay Katz, Informed Consent-A Fairy Tale? Laws Vision, 39 U. Prrr. L. RE'.. 137, 163-64
(1977); Davis E. Seidelson, Medical Malpractice: Informed Consent Cases in "Full-Disclosure"
Jurisdictions,14 DtuQ. L. REv. 309, 319 (1976).
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this method is used by the majority of jurisdictions which have adopted the
materiality standard.'8
The Canterbury court also recognized several exemptions to the requirement of
disclosure. These exceptions include risks that the patient already knew of, hazards
inherent to any surgical or medical procedure (e.g., infection), and emergencies
where the doctor has no time to obtain the patient's consent and waiting for consent
would further endanger the patient.' The Canterbury court also acknowledged a
"therapeutic privilege" allowing a physician to withhold disclosure if a patient would
become "so ill or emotionally distraught... as to... complicate or hinder the
treatment, or perhaps even pose psychological damage to the patient."'
b) The Individual PatientMethod
A minority of courts utilize the individual patient method which requires
physicians to disclose all possible risks which could influence that particular
patient's decision to consent to or refuse a specific procedure.' The seminal case
adopting this subjective or individual patient method is Scott v. Bradford,' decided
by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in 1979. The individual patient method set out
in Scott provides that "the scope of a physician's communication must be measured
by his patient's need to know enough to enable him to make an intelligent choice.
In other words, full disclosure of all material risks incident to treatment must be
made."
The Scott court further adopted a subjective standard for determining whether a
particular risk was material. Specifically, the court said that the materiality question
is whether "that particular patient" would still have consented to the treatment if the
specific risk had been disclosed, whether or not such choice would have been a
reasonable choice." If the patient would not have consented to the treatment if the
particular risk had been disclosed, such risk would be deemed to be material and
must be disclosed.'
Although this individual patient method recognizes a person's right to decide what
should be done to his body, the Supreme Court of North Carolina in McPherson v.
Ellis' recognized that a primary flaw with the individual patient method is that a
plaintiff can always testify that a risk would have been material and would have
precluded the plaintiff from consenting.' The McPherson court observed that "the

58. See Wallach & Berry, supra note 18, at 842-44.
59. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 788.

60. Id. at 789.
61. See Katz, supranote 57, at 163-64 (discussing the subjective or individual patient method used
by a minority of courts).

62. 606 P.2d 554 (Okla. 1979). See infra notes 137-61 and accompanying text for a detailed
discussion of the Scott case.
63. Id. at 558 (emphasis omitted).
64. See id.
65. See id
66. 287 S.E.2d 892 (N.C. 1982).

67. See id at 896.
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only evidence usually available is the plaintiffs bald assertion, tempered by
hindsight, as to what he would have done had he known all the facts."' Despite
its recognition of th'e subjective method's flaw, the McPherson court adopted the
subjective or individual patient method.' Subsequently, however, the North
Carolina legislature responded by enacting a statute imposing the objective or
reasonable patient standard for all medical malpractice claims occurring one year
after McPherson."

The North Carolina legislature is not the only state legislative body to seek
resolution of informed consent difficulty through enactments to oppose a state's
highest court's ruling. Three years before North Carolina enacted its remedial
legislation, Texas enacted a sweeping medical malpractice reform package aimed
at resolving problemis with medicolegal litigation in its state, including the confused
issue of informed consent.7
Il1. Texas' Treatment of Informed Consent: Reasonable Legislative Intervention
A. JudicialPrecedent

In 1967, the Supreme Court of Texas adopted the professional standard for
determining when a patient has given an informed consent.' In Wilson, the court

held that "the plaintiff had the burden to prove by expert medical evidence what a
reasonable medical practitioner of the same school and same or similar community
under the same or similar circumstances would have disclosed to his patient about
the risks incident to a proposed diagnosis or treatment."' Subsequent informed
consent cases in Texas strictly followed the Wilson professional standard,74 and also

promulgated a "therapeutic privilege"'5 and a consent exception for medical
emergencies.

6

Nevertheless, the Wilson professional standard was destined for a

short life in Texas.

68. Id.
69. See id.
70. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.13(a)(3) (1995). This statute provides that there shall be no
recovery for lack of informed consent where "[a] reasonable person, under all the surrounding
circumstances, would have undergone such treatment or procedure had he been advised by the health care
provider in accordance with the provisions of... this subsection." Id.
71. See Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act, ch. 817, pt. 1, 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws
2039 (codified as amended at TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i (West Supp. 1997)).
72. See Wilson v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1967).
73. Id. at 302.
74. See, e.g., Sherill v. McBride, 603 S.W.2d 365, 366-67 (fex. Civ. App. 1980, no writ)
(following the Wilson professional standard); Webb v. Jorns, 473 S.W.2d 328, 333-35 (fex.Civ. App.
1971) (holding that the professional standard is the appropriate measure for informed consent cases in
Texas), rev'd on other grounds, 488 S.W.2d 407 (Tex. 1972).
75. See Marsh v. Arnold, 446 S.W.2d 949, 951-53 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969, writ refd n.r.e.) (holding
that when a physician believes benefit of nondisclosure outweighed risks of disclosure, an explanation
of the specific risks is unnecessary).
76. See Gravis v. Fhysicians & Surgeons Hosp., 427 S.W.2d 310, 311 (Tex. 1968) (holding that
consent is implied in emergency situations).
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B. Trouble in Texas: The Legislature'sResponse to a PerceivedInsurance Crisis
Shortly after Wilson, Texas physicians, hospitals, and insurance company
lobbyists began to pressure the legislature for relief from the escalating cost of
medical malpractice insurance." At this time in the early 1970s, insurance rates
had increased at alarming rates and reached levels where many physicians and
hospitals were unable to afford coverage. 7' The inability to purchase insurance
coverage forced some physicians and hospitals in Texas to reduce the types of
procedures they performed, thus precluding many Texas citizens from receiving
necessary care.
Prior to 1975, no special legislation existed in Texas limiting a patient's right to
bring medical malpractice actions.' However, the Texas legislature in 1975
enacted the Professional Liability Insurance for Physicians, Podiatrists and Hospitals
Act ' in response to lobbying efforts from the healthcare industry.' The Act
abolished the "discovery rule" which tolls the statute of limitations until the patient
discovers or reasonably should have discovered an injury and established a two-year
statute of limitations period for medical malpractice actions.' The Act, however,
was but a temporary solution. The legislature intended to replace it with a more
comprehensive tort reform package,' and consequently, one year later, the Texas
legislature appointed the Texas Medical Professional Liability Study Commission
to study the medical liability insurance situation and offer suggestions to avert a
crisis.' The Commission, chaired by W. Page Keeton, former dean of the
University of Texas Law School,' presented its findings in the Keeton Report in
1977 which the Texas legislature adopted as the basis for the Medical Liability and
Insurance Improvement Act (MLIIA)."
C. The Texas MLIIA: A Reasonable Treatment of Informed Consent
The MLIIA, enacted in 1977, curtailed the frequency and severity of medical
malpractice claims against healthcare providers and ensured the availability and
affordability of liability insurance.' However, some commentators suggest that the

77. See Sherman & Pate, supra note 14, at 345.
78. See TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 1.02(a)(4) (West Supp. 1997).

§ 1.02(a)(6).
79. See id.
80. See Joseph P. Witherspoon, Constitutionalityof the Texas Statute Limiting LiabilityforMedical
Malpractice, 10 TEX.TECH L. REv. 419, 425-26 (1979).
81. Tax. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.82, § 4 (West 1976) (repealed 1977).

82. See Witherspoon, supra note 80, at 421.
83. See TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.82, § 4 (West 1976) (repealed 1977).
84. See Witherspoon, supra at note 80, at 421.
85. See FINAL REPORT, TEXAS MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY STUDY COMMITTEE 11-12

(1976).
86. W. Page Keeton was also the Dean of the University of Oklahoma College of Law in the 1940s.
87. Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act, ch. 817, pt. 1, 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws 2039
(codified as amended at TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i (West Supp. 1997)).
88. See Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 1.02(a)(13) (West Supp. 1997). The Texas Medical
Professional Liability Study Commission's findings were adopted in subsection (13) of section 1.02(a)
which now provides: "Mhese facts have been verified by the Medical Professional Liability Study
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Texas legislature misconstrued the Keeton Report in an effort to distort the
magnitude of the insurance crisis.s Despite criticisms of the MLIIA, two recent
Supreme Court of Texas cases deciding medical informed consent issues failed to
question the MLIIAs legitimacy, thus suggesting that the high court of Texas agreed
with the Act's purpose and its legislative history.
The informed consent sections of the ML11A9' depart drastically from Texas'
pre-1975 treatment of medical informed consent and represent a novel means of
determining the adequacy and sufficiency of informed consent. The Texas Medical
Disclosure Panel' (the Disclosure Panel) established by the MLIIA "determin[es]

which risks and hazards related to medical care and surgical procedures must be
disclosed by health care providers or physicians to their patients or persons

authorized to consent for their patients and to establish the general form and
substance of such disclosure." ' Six physicians and three lawyers appointed by the
Texas Commissioner of Health comprise the Disclosure Panel."

Commission, which was created by the 64th Legislature. For further amplification of these facts the
legislature adopts the findings of the report of the commission." Id. Section 1.02(b) further provides:
(b) Because of the conditions stated in Subsection (a) of this section, it is the purpose
of this Act to improve and modify the system by which health care liability claims are
determined in order to:
(1) reduce e:cessive frequency and severity of health care liability claims through
reasonable improvements and modifications in the Texas insurance, tort, and medical
practice systems;
(2) decrease the cost of those claims and assure that awards are mtionally related to
actual damages;
(3) do so in a manner that will not unduly restrict a claimant's rights any more than
necessary to deal with the crisis;
(4) make available to physicians, hospitals, and other health care providers protection
against potential liability through the insurance mechanism at reasonably affordable rates;
(5) make affordable medical and health care more accessible and available to the
citizens of Texa;;
(6) make certain modifications in the medical, insurance, and legal systems in order
to determine whether or not there will be an effect on rates charged by insurers for
medical professional liability insurance; and
(7) make certain modifications to the liability laws as they relate to health care liability
claims only and with an intention of the legislature to not extend or apply such
modifications of liability laws to any other area of the Texas legal system or tort law.
Id. § 1.02(b).
89. See Darrell L. Keith, The Texas Medical Liability and Insurance Act - A Survey and Analysis
of Its History, Constructionand Constitutionality,36 BAYLOR L. REV. 265,268 (1984) (suggesting that
Healthcare lobbyists distorted the Keeton Report findings to enable health care providers to pay less
insurance premiums); Witherspoon, supra note 80, at 422-24 (implying that the Keeton Act was distorted
to make informed consent claims more difficult to bring against healthcare providers).
90. See, e.g., Barclay v. Campbell, 704 S.W.2d 8 (Tex. 1986); Peterson v. Shields, 652 S.W.2d 929
(Tex. 1983). These cases are discussed in more detail infra at notes 112-31 and accompanying text.
91. TEx. REv. Ctv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, §§ 6.01-6.07 (West Supp. 1997).
92. See id. § 6.03.
93. Id § 6.03(a).
94. See id. § 6.03(z), (d).
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Subchapter F of the NIA defines the standard for informed consent in the
medical context. Thus, informed consent actions in Texas became by legislative fiat,
as defined in section 6.02, actionable negligence claims:
In a suit against a physician or health care provider involving a health
care liability claim that is based on the failure of the physician or health
care provider to disclose or adequately to disclose the risks and hazards
involved in the medical care or surgical procedure rendered by the
physician or health care provider, the only theory on which recovery
may be obtained is that of negligence infailing to disclose the risks or
hazards that could have influenced a reasonable person in making a
decision to give or withhold consent.95
This statutory definition resembles the reasonable patient method adopted by a
majority of jurisdictions utilizing a materiality standard for informed consent."
This section, in part, mandates the specific risks and hazards which must be
disclosed.' The actual disclosure requirements in effect codify the professional
standard, because the Disclosure Panel articulates the risks and hazards that must
be disclosed by all physicians and health care providers.
The Disclosure Panel segregates medical procedures into two disclosure lists. List
A consists of procedures that require some form of disclosure, and the Disclosure
Panel determines the exact form of disclosure required for each procedure on this
A list." List B includes the remaining procedures which may be administered with
no specifically defined disclosure of any risks or hazards.' A written explanation
of the procedures on both lists is published annually in the Texas Register (See
Appendix for an excerpt from the Disclosure Lists). °
Section 6.05 of the MLIIA defines the precise disclosure of the risks and hazards
involved in the List A procedures,' and the manner in which physicians and
health care providers must disclose this information is governed by section 6.06 of
the MLIIA,'" i.e., "disclosure shall be considered effective ... if it is given in
writing, signed by the patient or a person authorized to give the consent and by a
competent witness, and if the written consent specifically states the risks and
hazards that are involved in the medical care or surgical procedure. ..."
Although no Texas cases have challenged the validity of written consent forms,
many commentators criticize their readability and argue that patients often lack the
capacity to understand the consequences of signing these forms. 4 Nevertheless,

95. Id. § 6.02 (emphasis added).
96. See supra notes 53-71 and accompanying text.
97. See, e.g., TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 6.04(a)-(d) (West Supp. 1997).

98. See id,
§ 6.04(b)-(c).
99. See id.
100. See id.
§ 6.04(c).
101. See id. § 6.05.
102. See id. § 6.06.

103. ld
104. See, e.g., Marilyn T. Baker & Harvey A. Taub, Ph.D., Readability ofInformed Consent Forms
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written consent as mandated by the MLIA and guided by the Disclosure Lists
published in the Texas Register remains the standard for informed consent
disclosure in Texas.
The apparent legislative intent of the MLIIA was guidance for physicians and

health care providers to prepare patients for medical procedures and to assist courts
in determining if a patient's consent was truly informed. Disclosure of List A risks
and hazards as p:ovided in section 6.07, as well as nondisclosure of List B
procedures made according to sections 6.05 and 6.06, are "admissible in evidence
and shall create a rebuttable presumption" that the physician or health care provider
did satisfy the disclosure requirements of the MLHA.ee At first, compliance with

section 6.06 created an irrebuttable presumption that the physician or health care
provider had satisfied the duty of disclosure."° However, the Attorney General of
Texas concluded that an irrebuttable presumption created by section 6.06 violated
a patient's right to a jury trial."° Consequently, the Texas legislature made
compliance merely a rebuttable presumption of informed consent."°n

Finally, section 6.07(b) addresses the disclosure requirements for procedures
which the Disclosure Panel has yet to examine and place on either list." This
catch-all provision offers little guidance to the health care provider, stating simply
that "[i]f medical care or surgical procedure is rendered with respect to which the
panel has made no determination either way regarding a duty of disclosure, the
physician or health care provider is under the duty otherwise imposed by law." '
This "otherwise imposed" phrasing, critics contend, will likely lead to unnecessary

litigation required to determine the correct statutory interpretation of this unartful
drafting."'

for Research in Veterans Administration Medical Centers, 250 JAMA 2646 (1983); Richard Sherlock,
Ph.D., Competency to Consent to Medical Care: Toward a General View, 6 GEN. HosP. PSYcHIATRY
71 (1984); William lMl.jltman, J.D., M.A., et al., Autonomy, Competence, and Informed Consent in Long
Term Care: Legal and PsychologicalPerspectives, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1671 (1992); Kenneth Dedeker,
M.D., Informed Consent vs. Consent Forms, 66 MINN. MED. 575 (1983).
105. See TEx. Rv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, §§ 6.04, 6.06, 6.07(a)(2) (West Supp. 1997).
106. See Elliot, supra note 89, at 384.
107. See Tex. Att'y Gen. LA-135 (1977). In an advisory letter, the Texas Attorney General
concluded that:
Since the utilization of the signed form would constitute consent as a'matter of law, the
jury would be unable to inquire into the actual validity of the consent. Presumably the
form could be signed by a person who could read or by an individual who was not
competent to unierstand the document. Yet the statute would make such consent effective
without further inquiry. What has been a fact issue would be taken from the jury's
consideration and would be transformed into an irrebuttable presumption. Where the
statute makes signature on the form conclusive on the issue of consent, it would be a
denial of the constitutional right to have the issue determined by a jury.
lid (citations omitted).
108. See TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590, § 6.07 (West Supp. 1997).
109. See id. § 6.07(b).
110. Id. (emphasis added).
I 11. See Frank W Elliott, The Impact of the Texas Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement
Act on Informed ConsentRecovery in Medical MalpracticeLitigation, 10 TEx. TECH L. REV. 381, 388-
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D. The Supreme Court of Texas: IgnoringLegislative Intent?
In 1983, the Supreme Court of Texas did not disappoint the critics of the MLIIA
when it decided Peterson v. Shields,"2 a medical malpractice action brought by a
woman who claimed that her physician failed to inform her of the risks inherent to
a lymph node biopsy."' Because the Disclosure Panel "had not evaluated and
published [its] determination of the type of disclosure required in lymph node
biopsies" at the time of this woman's surgery,"' the physician/defendant argued
that the disclosure standard was what a physician in the same community would
have disclosed under the same circumstance, or the duty otherwise imposed by the
law at that time."'
The trial court directed the verdict for the physician/defendant because the
patient/plaintiff was unable to offer expert opinion that the physician breached the
local standards of disclosure."' The trial court, citing Wilson v. Scott," upheld
the "locality rule" by stating that:
The plaintiff had the burden to prove by expert medical evidence what
a reasonable medical practitioner of the same school and same or
similar community under the same or similar circumstances would have
disclosed to his patient about the risks incident to a proposed diagnosis
or treatment .... "'
When the Supreme Court of Texas heard the plaintiffs appeal, it focused on
section 6.07(b) of the MLIIA in determining that the disclosure standard for
procedures not included on Lists A or B is the reasonable patient method."'
Section 6.07(b) reads, "If medical care or surgical procedure is rendered with
respect to which the panel has made no determination either way regarding a duty
of disclosure, the physician or health care provider is under the duty otherwise
imposed by law."'" The Peterson court relied on section 6.02 to decide what the
legislature intended by the language "duty otherwise imposed by law."'' Because
section 6.02 contained the phrase "failing to disclose the risks or hazards that could
have influenced a reasonable person," the court adopted the reasonable patient
89 (1979) (discussing poor drafting that leads to difficulty in construing the statute); Alan Meisel & Lisa
D. Kabnick, Informed Consent to Medical Treatment:An Analysis of Recent Legislation,41 U. Prrr. L.
REv. 407, 536-41 (1980) (discussing how poor drafting hampers the proper construction of statutes);
Susan Kessler Rachlin, Comment, The Effect of the Texas Medical Liability and InsuranceImprovement
Act on the Texas Standardfor Medical Disclosure, 17 Hous. L. REv. 615, 625-27 (1980) (discussing
that the drafting of the statute is difficult to construe).
112. 652 S.W.2d 929 (Tex. 1983).
113. See id.
at 930.

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 931.
See id. at 930.
See id.
412 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1967).
Peterson, 652 S.W.2d at 930 (quoting Wilson v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d 299, 302 (Tex. 1967)).
See idU at 931.
TEx. REv. Ctv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 6.07(b) (West Supp. 1997).
See Peterson, 652 S.W.2d at 931.
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method for situaticns in which the Disclosure Panel had not sorted a procedure into
either List A or List B.' 22
This interpretation is inconsistent with other language in the MLIIAW and
arguably ignores the legislature's intent in passing the MLIIA to curb the frequency
and severity of medical malpractice actions. In requiring the Disclosure Panel,
partially comprised of physicians, to determine the scope and form of disclosure
required for all medical procedures in Texas, the legislature impliedly adopted the
professional standard. Furthermore, the reasonableness language in section 6.02
seems to serve more as guidance for the Disclosure Panel in its process of deciding
the scope and form of disclosure, rather than an explanation of what the "duty
otherwise imposed by law" language in section 6.02 of the MLIIA was intended to
convey. Because the Supreme Court of Texas adopted the professional standard in
Wilson v. Scott,'"' it seems logical that the legislature would have explicitly
overruled this standard in the MLIIA's section on procedures not included on Lists
A or B. Therefore, the Peterson court clearly stepped outside of the MLIA in
reaching its holding.
The Supreme Court of Texas continued to carve away the effectiveness of the
MLIIA in Barclay v. Campbell.'" The Barclay decision ignored well-settled
precedent from the vast majority of jurisdictions and terminated the therapeutic
privilege for cases involving procedures not included on Lists A or B. The Barclay
plaintiff brought a medical malpractice action, claiming, inter alia, that his physician
failed to disclose the risks and hazards inherent to prescribing neuroleptic drugs for
treating mental illnesses."
The patient/plaintiff argued that the probability of contracting tardive dyskinesia,
an adverse reaction to neuroleptic drugs, was significant enough to influence a
reasonable person in deciding whether or not to take the drugs." z The court of
appeals agreed that if this risk was material enough to influence a reasonable
person, disclosure would then be proper." Nevertheless, the court of appeals
excused the physician/defendant's failure to disclose because the patient/plaintiff was
suffering from schizophrenia and perforce was not a reasonable person. The court
of appeals concluded "that it was the legislature's intent to excuse a defendant who
is negligent in failing to disclose a risk if it was not medically feasible to make the
disclosure.""' Essentially, the court of appeals held that the physician/defendant
had a therapeutic privilege to refuse disclosure if it might harm the patient.
The Supreme Court of Texas in Barclay disagreed with the court of appeals and
held that "it was not the legislature's intent to take away an individual's right to
make such decisions for himself just because his doctor does not believe his patient

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

See iU
See TIx. REv, Clv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 607(b) (West Supp. 1997).
412 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1967).
704 S.W.2d 8 (Tex. 1986).
See id. at 9.
See i.
See id.
I. at 10.
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is reasonable."'" The Barclay court strictly followed the Peterson reasoning and
concluded that if a reasonable person could have been influenced by the disclosure,
then Barclay (the schizophrenic plaintiff) was also entitled to be warned by the
disclosure.'
In giving no deference to a physician's judgment, the Barclay court's stringent
adherence to the reasonable patient method seems almost doctrinaire. Because the
Barclay court rejected the therapeutic privilege for unclassified procedures, it
effectively created by judicial fiat two informed consent disclosure standards. For
List A procedures, section 6.07(a)(2) retains the therapeutic privilege, and thus
nondisclosure is only actionable under a negligence theory. However, for unlisted
procedures (i.e., procedures on neither List A nor List B), the lack of the therapeutic
privilege virtually gives rise to strict liability for nondisclosure. The remaining
exception to nondisclosure for unlisted procedures is the emergency exemption
which allows physicians to waive patient consent if the delay in obtaining the same
would endanger the life of the patient, but the Supreme Court of Texas has yet to
rule on this exigent aspect for informed consent.
E. The Teachings of Petersonand Barclay
Despite the opinions from the Supreme Court of Texas in Peterson and Barclay
which are inconsistent with the MLIIA, the Texas legislature seems content not to
revise the MLIIA to clarify the specific areas discussed in these two cases. Until
the legislature does revise these areas of the MLIIA, physicians practicing in Texas
must proceed with medical, as well as legal, caution when performing procedures
which are on neither Disclosure Panel lists. More importantly, other legislatures
might well heed the unintentional warning from the Supreme Court of Texas and
ensure that their legislative initiatives regarding informed consent are drafted with
precision and clarity so that the controversial aspects of the Disclosure Lists are
avoided.
IV. Informed Consent in Oklahoma: Texas' Needy Neighbor
Informed consent in Oklahoma is a relatively new, court-imposed legal doctrine.
The current subjective or individual patient standard contradicts previous dicta by
the Supreme Court of Oklahoma describing how informed consent should be treated
by Oklahoma's courts.'
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma in 1973 first encountered the doctrine of informed consent in Martin v. Stratton.' Although the
Martin court never expressly adopted the doctrine of informed consent, the court
explained what the standard should be in Oklahoma." Justice Berry opined:
M

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id.
See ia at 10-11.
See, e.g., Martin v. Stratton, 515 P.2d 1366 (Okla. 1973).
515 P.2d 1366 (Okla. 1973).
See id. at 1369-70.
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We conclude that if the theory of liability referred to as "informed
consent" is ever adopted by this Court the plaintiff will have the burden
to either introduce evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer
that the defendant failed to disclose to plaintiff what a reasonably
prudent physician in the medical community in the exercise of
reasonable care would have disclosed to his patient, or evidence from
which the jury could reasonably infer that material risks were inherent
in the proposed medical procedure in terms of seriousness, probability
of occurrence and feasibility of alternatives, and defendant failed to
disclose these risks to plaintiff.3
Despite Justice Berry's prediction of how Oklahoma ought to deal with informed
consent, six years later the Supreme Court of Oklahoma shocked many legal and
medical professionals by adopting a substantially different standard for informed
consent." The Supreme Court of Oklahoma in Scott v. Bradford'37 held that "the
scope of a physician's communications must be measured by his patient's need to
know, enough to enable him to make an intelligent choice. In other words, full
disclosure of all material risks incident to treatment must be made."'3' The
subjective or individual patient method adopted by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma
in Scott makes informed consent, in even the best of circumstances, an impossible
burden for the health care provider by requiring that each patient be informed of all
possible risks that he or she might find relevant in consenting to treatment.
The plaintiff in Scott brought a surgical malpractice action after she experienced
incontinence problems caused by a vesico-vaginal fistula, a complication resulting
froni a hysterectomy. 39 She never claimed that the physician/defendant was
negligent in performing the surgery, but rather she argued that if the
physician/defendant had advised her of the risks of developing a vesico-vaginal
fistula, she would have refused the operation."4 Essentially, she argued that her
consent was not "informed," and therefore the physician/defendant was liable for the
injuries even though he was not negligent. 4'
At the trial court, the jury entered a verdict in favor of the physician/defendant.
Although the Supreme Court of Oklahoma found that the trial court gave
sufficiently broad jury instructions regarding a physician's duty to disclose, the Scott
court formally recognized the doctrine of informed consent. 42 The court also
established the foundational elements that a patient/plaintiff must prove in order to
maintain an action against a physician/defendant for failure to obtain an informed

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

hId at 1370 (enphasis added).
See Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554 (Okla. 1979).
606 P.2d 554 (Okla. 1979).
Id. at 558.
See id at 556,
See id
See id.

142. See id. at 558.
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consent before a medical procedure." The Scott court held that a patient/plaintiff
suing under an informed consent theory must allege and prove:
1) defendant physician failed to inform him adequately of a material
risk before securing his consent to the proposed treatment;
2) if he had been informed of the risks he would not have consented
to the treatment;
3) the adverse consequences that were not made known did in fact
occur and he was injured as a result of submitting to the treatment.'"
The Scott standard for informed consent significantly deviates from the Martin
court's suggested standard. The subjective or individual patient method adopted in
Scott infinitely enlarges the category of risks which a physician must inform the
patient about before consent can be truly informed. Under the Martin professional
standard, it would have been sufficient for a physician to warn the patient of risks
customarily disclosed by. other physicians under similar circumstances.' 45 By
requiring a physician to disclose all material risks that might affect a particular
patient's decision regarding a procedure, the Scott court places an unreasonable, if
not unbearable, burden on the physician to know what risks and hazards are
important to each individual patient. This standard makes the patient the final
arbiter of disclosure because the patient, by this egregious standard, is the only one
who knows what information would actually impact her decision to consent to a
procedure.
From the physician's viewpoint, the Scott decision renders informed consent
practically impossible. More importantly, the Scott standard is susceptible to abuse
because of the essential importance given to the patient/plaintiffs testimony. For
example, when patients/plaintiffs contemplate medical malpractice actions, hindsight
can become perfectly clear. Therefore, if a particular risk materializes in the form
of an injury, patients/plaintiffs could understandably be tempted to conclude post
facto that informing of such a risk would have influenced their decisions to accept
treatment.
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma recognized the practical shortcomings of the
Scott standard but offered little guidance for Oklahoma physicians, noting that
"[a]lIthough it might be said this approach places a physician at the mercy of a
patient's hindsight, a careful practitioner can always protect himself by insuring that
he has adequately informed each patient he treats."'" Many medical procedures
involve myriad risks and hazards, varying in likelihood and seriousness, and the
Scott court's impractical guideline provides no meaningful assistance to physicians.
As a practical matter, physicians can hardly inform each patient of every conceivable risk. Consequently, physicians must exercise their judgment in the
disclosure process. After Scott, however, should an undisclosed risk of treatment

143.
144.
145.
146.

See id. at 559.
Id.
See Martin v. Stratton, 515 P.2d 1366, 1369-70 (Okla.1973).
Scott, 606 P.2d at 559.
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manifest into an injury, the physician may well face a patient's self-serving
testimony in an informed consent medical malpractice action that is largely based
on clear hindsight.
Three other jurisdictions have faced the decision of whether to adopt the
subjective method of determining informed consent147 since the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma issued the Scott opinion, and each found Scott unpersuasive. In 1984, the
Court of Appeals of South Carolina in Hook v. Rothstein"~ declined to follow
Scott and adopted a reasonable practitioner standard for informed consent. 4 One
year later, the Supreme Court of Mississippi in Reikes v. Martin" rejected the
"subjective test" of Scott. The Reikes court reasoned:
The problem with the subjective test [is] . . . "[s]ince at the time of trial
the uncommunicated hazard has materialized, it would be surprising if
the patient-plaintiff did not claim that had he been informed of the
dangers he would have declined treatment. Subjectively he may believe
so with the 20-20 vision of hindsight, but we doubt that justice will be
served by placing the physician in jeopardy of the patient's bitterness
and disillusionment."'5
Finally, in Arena v. Gingrich," the Court of Appeals of Oregon held that a fact
finder could discern whether the particular patient/plaintiff had given an informed
consent, using the objective or reasonable patient method." In rejecting Scott and
the subjective method, the Arena court concluded:
The real question is whether this plaintiff would have consented if she
had been properly informed. Although the subjective question is the
ultimate one, we do not agree with plaintiffs and the Scott court's view
that only evidence about the particular plaintiffs subjective reactions and
decision can be relevant to that question. Evidence and arguments about
whether other patients - hypothetical or real - would have consented
under similar circumstances can assist the factfinder in evaluating the
plaintiffs credibility and in exercising its common sense. 5
Recognizing that
be bootstrapped by
and the Physician's
liability insurance

medical malpractice actions based on lack of consent can well
plaintiffs' testimony, the Oklahoma State Medical Association
Liability Insurance Company (an Oklahoma physician-owned
carrier) urge physicians to utilize consent forms with all

147. See, e.g., Arena v. Gingrich, 733 P.2d 75 (Or. Ct. App. 1987); Reikes v. Martin, 471 So. 2d
385 (Miss. 1985); Hook v. Rothstein, 316 S.E.2d 690 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984).
148. 316 S.E.2d 690 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984).

149. See id. at 698.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

471 So. 2d 385 (Miss. 1985).
See id. at 392-93.
Id. (quoting Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 11-12 (Cal. 1972)).
733 P.2d 75 (Or. Ct. App. 1987).
See id. at 78-79.

155. Id. at 79.
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procedures." Although the Supreme Court of Oklahoma and the lower courts in
Oklahoma have yet to address a medical malpractice case based on the use of
consent forms, the mere specter of an informed consent case may lead to better
communications between patients and physicians. Nonetheless, consent forms
cannot be the only disclosure to the patient, rather the forms are intended to
supplement more specific discussion about risks and hazards between the physician
and the patient. However, until case law is available in Oklahoma clarifying the role
of consent forms, many commentators will remain suspect about the legal protection
offered by consent forms.'"
V. The Lone Star Solution: A Legislative Proposalfor Oklahoma
The subjective informed consent standard of Scott would appear to subject
Oklahoma physicians to the clarity of patients/plaintiffs' hindsight vision and recall
of events, sometimes clouded by bitterness and disillusionment. It has become clear
that the Supreme Court of Oklahoma does not want to reconsider the precedent of
its Scott holding, as indicated by the number of years the decision has remained the
standard. Indeed, the Scott standard has been followed in at least four published
Oklahoma opinions." The time has come for the Oklahoma legislature, as it did
for the Texas legislature in 1977, to balance patients/plaintiffs' interest of informed
consent against the interests of physicians needing a workable and reasonable
standard by which to inform all patients. The example of the MLIIA which has
governed the determination of informed consent in Texas for nearly two decades
may offer a framework for the Oklahoma legislature.
The Oklahoma legislature could well begin a reform of informed consent law by
establishing its own Medical Disclosure Panel in the fashion of the Texas Disclosure
Panel. However, unlike the Texas Panel, which is comprised of six physicians and
three lawyers, the Oklahoma Panel could expand the Panel representation to include
disinterested laypersons from outside the medical and legal professions, and in so
doing, broaden its patients' rights advocacy. Certainly the Oklahoma Panel must
include lawyers and doctors, but the inclusion of laypersons might temper the
panel's deliberations with a dispassionate layman's perspective, perhaps more akin
to a patient's advocate.
No special interest group should have an undue influence on the scope and form
of the disclosure standards established by this Panel. The representatives must be
insulated from any pressures from the medical community, the plaintiffs bar, the
defense bar, or other influential sources possibly interested in affecting informed
consent disclosure requirements. From wherever these representatives are drawn,
the primary consideration must be their impartial independent judgments about risks

156. Medical StaffNews: Informed Consent,ST. ANTHoNY MED. STAFF NEws (St. Anthony Hosp.,
Oklahoma City, Okla.), July 1986, at 2.
157. See various articles supra note 104 and accompanying text for a discussion of consent forms.
158. See, e.g., Hull v. United States, 971 F.2d 1499 (10th Cir. 1992); Haley v. United States, 739
F.2d 1502 (10th Cir. 1984); Smith v. Reisig, 686 P.2d 285 (Okla. 1984); Goss v. Oklahoma Blood Inst.,
856 P.2d 998 (Okla. Ct. App. 1990).
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to be disclosed in establishing an informed consent standard for Oklahoma's health
care providers.
A major problem with the Texas MLIIA was that the Disclosure Lists remained
incomplete at the Act's effective date, thus creating a third unspecified list of
procedures for which the standard of disclosure was yet to be defined.159 Several
Texas lawsuits arose in which plaintiffs claimed nondisclosure of risks inherent to
a procedure that was not included on either List A or List B." If the Oklahoma
legislature should follow the lead of the Texas legislature, much of Oklahoma's
standards could be patterned after the work already completed by the Texas Panel.
Instead of examining every medical procedure de novo, the Oklahoma Panel could
adopt the Texas Panel's standards. In those specific procedures where the Oklahoma
representatives felt the disclosure requirements were overinclusive or underinclusive,
the disclosure requirements' language could be fine-tuned to conform to the
Oklahoma Panel's perspective. In this way, perhaps the incomplete listing that
plagued the early Texas experience would be avoided in Oklahoma.
Although the Oklahoma Disclosure Panel might adopt the Texas Disclosure Lists
and examine and classify most procedures before this proposed reform legislation
takes effect, certain procedures could remain unlisted, for example, either new
treatments or procedures the Panel overlooked. Oklahoma's legislation should
explicitly provide a disclosure standard for these unlisted procedures. The
shortcomings inherent in the Scott subjective standard for informed consent would
likely persuade the Oklahoma legislature to adopt another standard. Because the
Disclosure Panel's requirements of disclosure for List A procedures are premised,
in part, on what reasonable doctors would disclose to their patients, a consistent
standard of disclosure for unclassified procedures seems a logical progression of
legislative intent. A reasonable practitioner standard was the standard for informed
consent that the Supreme Court of Oklahoma suggested in Martin, six years before
it decided Scott. The Oklahoma legislature could well serve the state by resurrecting
this informed consent standard as a "reasonable" compromise to satisfy the
competing interests involved in this controversial area.
Although the Texas MLIIA adopted a therapeutic privilege and an emergency
exception for disclosure of its List A procedures, the Texas legislature failed to
address whether these exemptions from disclosure applied to all unlisted procedures.
Subsequently, the Supreme Court of Texas in Barclay eliminated the therapeutic
privilege for unclassified procedures."' The Supreme Court of Texas, however,
has yet to decide a controversy dealing with the emergency exception for informed
consent disclosure of unlisted procedures. In order to avoid these same statutory
problems, the Oklahoma legislature should address these exemption issues in its
reform legislation. 'Because the therapeutic privilege and the emergency exception

159. See John Patrizk Polewski, Texas Adopts an Objective Standard of Medical Disclosure: "Is
There a ReasonableLayperson in the House?." 15 TEX. TECH L. REv. 389, 402-03 (1984).
160. See id. at 403.
161. See Barclay v, Campbell, 704 S.W.2d 8 (Tex. 1986). See also supra notes 125-31 for a
discussion of the Barclay case.
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are included in the Texas MLIIA for List A procedures, it would seem inconsistent
if both exemptions did not apply to unlisted procedures. If the Oklahoma legislature
can enact legislation modeled after the MLIIA including these reform modifications,
certainly a problematic proposition, it could well achieve a reasonable and
predictable standard for informed consent, eliminating the inherent inequities in the
Scott court's subjective method that is the judicial standard in Oklahoma today.
VI. An Uncertain Future
Therapeutic miracles and lifesaving treatments which enable Oklahomans to live
longer and more fulfilling lives have given the citizens of our state a world class
health care delivery system. However, unrelenting exposure to medicolegal liability
may well force many of the physicians and other health care providers responsible
for this state's health care to reduce the scope of their practices, and in some cases
to cease providing services. Medical malpractice cases brought under a lack of
informed consent theory using Oklahoma's Scott subjective standard, as currently
applied by Oklahoma's courts, enhance the medicolegal liability exposure for doctors
and other health care providers.
The M.IIA has successfully provided guidance in the form of disclosure
requirements for medical procedures in Texas, achieving a legislatively created and
balanced approach to informing patients and obtaining their consent for medical or
surgical procedures. The Oklahoma legislature could benefit the state by enacting
similar guidelines for health care providers to provide a uniform, predictable
solution to the informed consent dilemma created by the Scott opinion. Unless the
legislature acts, Oklahoma health care providers will face the future, uncertain about
their liability exposure, remaining vulnerable to the patients they seek to help.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1996

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:651

APPENDIX

20 TEXAS REGISTER 2594
25 TEXAS ADMISTRATIVE CODE 601.1-601.6
TITLE 25. HEALTH SERVICES
PART VII. TEXAS MEDICAL DISCLOSURE PANEL
CHAPTER 601. INFORMED CONSENT MEDICAL TREATMENTS
AND SURGICAL PROCEDURE ESTABLISHED BY THE TEXAS
MEDICAL DISCLOSURE PANEL
601.1. General.
(a) The purpose of this chapter is to implement the requirements of the Medical
Liability and Insurance Improvement Act of Texas, Texas Civil Statutes, Article
4590i; Subchapter F, relating to informed consent.
(b) The treatments and procedures requiring full disclosure by a physician or
health care provider to a patient or person authorized to consent for the patient are
found in 601.2 of this title (relating to Procedures Requiring Full Disclosure-List A).
(c) The treatments and procedures requiring no disclosure by a physician or
health care provider to a patient or person authorized to consent for the patient are
found in 601.3 of this title (relating to Procedures Requiring No Disclosure-List B).
601.2. Procedures :Requiring Full Disclosure-List A.
Thyroidectomy
(A) Injury to nerves resulting in hoarseness or impairment of speech.
(B) Injury to parathyroid glands resulting in low blood calcium levels that require
extensive medication to avoid serious degenerative conditions, such as cataracts,
brittle bones, muscle weakness and muscle irritability.
(C) Lifelong requirement of thyroid medication.
Cornealsurgery, such as corneal transplant,refractive surgery and pterygium.
(A) Complications requiring additional treatment and/or surgery.
(B) Possible pain.
(C) Need for glasses or contact lenses.
(D) Partial or totd loss of vision.
Glaucoma surgery by any method.
(A) Complications requiring additional treatment and/or surgery.
(B) Worsening of the glaucoma.
(C) Pain.
(D) Partial or total loss of vision.
Removal of the eye or its contents (enucleation or evisceration).
(A) Complications requiring additional treatment and/or surgery.
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(B) Worsening or unsatisfactory appearance.
(C) Recurrence or spread of disease.
Surgeryfor penetratingocular injury, including intraocularforeign body.
(A) Complications requiring additional treatment and/or surgery, including
removal of the eye.
(B) Chronic pain.
(C) Partial or total loss of vision.
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